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STUDY PROJECT

REFORMING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE RESERVE COMPONENTS

1995 - 2005

BY

COLONEL THOMAS R. CAGLEY
United States Army

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The paper concludes with three specific recommendations: creation of a Reserve MI Group to command and control all MI assets and personnel in ARCOM and Training Divisions, elimination of the Military Intelligence Detachments (Strategic) as colonel commands, and establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at each ARCOM and Training Division.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

REFORMING MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
RESERVE COMPONENTS: 1995-2005

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Thomas R. Cagley, MI

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Thomas R. Cagley, COL, MI
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Military Intelligence (MI) Reserve Components (RC) are not optimally managed. MI RC assets receive limited support from their administrative chain-of-command, while being expected to perform normal operational missions from CAPSTONE or active components.

The author will apply relevant command experience to analyze the existing system and propose suggestions to alter command-and-control of MI RC units to make them more responsive, productive and professionally managed. The paper will provide an overview of existing MI unit structures, as well as an examination of a short-lived MI Command in 2d CONUSA. The focus of the study will be on systemic practices that adversely affect the professionalism and training of RC MI units and personnel, thus degrading the readiness of this vital element of the Total Army.

Using the guidance provided by the DCSINT's 2 July 1990 White Paper, along with personal experience, the author will examine the need for unit realignment, a radical change to the existing command-and-control of MI RC assets, a more professional employment of MI RC assets, and answers to the questions posed by the DCSINT in his White Paper.

The paper concludes with three specific recommendations: creation of a Reserve MI Group to command and control all MI assets and personnel in ARCOM and Training Divisions, elimination of the Military Intelligence Detachments (Strategic) as colonel commands, and establishment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence at each ARCOM and Training Division.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"The relationship between leader and intelligence adviser must maintain a delicate balance between intimacy and detachment. The danger of too intimate a relationship is that a professional intelligence adviser will identify so closely with the leader's past policies and decisions that he loses all sense of objectivity. On the other hand, too distant a relationship may enable the leader to maintain his independence at the high price of losing contact with the intelligence community."(1)

In commenting on a number of dilemmas faced by members of the intelligence community, Michael Handel has alluded to one issue very prevalent in the reserve components (RC). In particular, the majority of RC military intelligence (MI) units are so "distant" from their operational and administrative chains-of-command that their effectiveness is seriously challenged.

RC MI units are not distant in merely a geographical or administrative sense. They also find their superiors lacking an understanding of even basic intelligence doctrine and capabilities. John Macartney, addressing broader national issues, stressed that:

"Decision makers should understand what intelligence can do for them, what it cannot do, and how to use it. But in my experience, many do not."(2)

This appears to be precisely the difficulty in the relationship between reserve MI units and their higher headquarters. MI activities and units are viewed too frequently as organizations

peopled by intellectuals, with missions that are shrouded in secrecy, conducted in a clandestine atmosphere, and not really relevant at the tactical, operational or strategic level. As a result of years of such misunderstanding, failures in communication, classified missions, and ignorance of their mission by higher RC commanders, RC MI units generally have a negative reputation. Compounding the problem is the fact that intelligence as a professional discipline has certain mechanical requirements, such as high-level security clearances, technical and or linguistic training, and strong analytical abilities. Finally, while intelligence failures are well publicized, successes are less well-known. All of this contributes to an attitude of tolerance on the part of senior leaders, rather than one of cooperation and mutual dependence.

This chapter will give an overview of some of the problems currently existing in MI RC units, with expansion and details provided in Chapter III. In order to better understand how these situations could exist, it will be beneficial to examine a few RC MI unit structures. Chapter II presents a brief look at some of the major RC MI units, with descriptions of their missions, in broad terms. One Continental US Army (CONUSA) attempted to solve many of these same problems by creation of a Military Intelligence Command (MICON); the results of that effort are found in Chapter IV. Finally, Chapter V will recommend new unit designs, as well

as alternative administrative practices, all of which should lead to improved employment of MI RC assets.

Many senior commanders view RC MI units as means to an unrelated end, since the units offer a variety of unique promotion and training opportunities for non-MI personnel. Additionally, some commanders will not hesitate to pull assets away from MI units to round-out or cross-level non-MI units. They do this without realizing the impact on the effectiveness of MI units, particularly strategic detachments.

Another factor that contributes to misuse of RC MI assets is the geographical location of many of them. Of the 236 RC MI units, over 30% are located in the First CONUSA area (Figure I-1). When the planned consolidation of the 4th and 1st CONUSAs occurs in FY92, First Army will have over 50% of the RC MI assets (Figure I-2). The difficulties, in the past, have included a lack of adequate staffing at the CONUSA to ensure pro-active management and oversight. In 1st CONUSA, this responsibility has rested primarily with an an Active/Guard Reserve (AGR) lieutenant colonel.

Further challenges to effective management of RC MI units include its training and security requirements, which frequently prohibit transfer of personnel from non-MI units, in turn creating the negative impressions of elitism and "clubiness". Some MI units have used their classified mission as an excuse to deny

**Continental US Armies
Reserve MI Units (Current)**




Figure 1-1

**Continental US Armies
Reserve MI Units (after Oct 91)**




Figure 1-2

access to senior staff and commanders, effectively closing off communication and understanding.

The reserves constitute 58% of intelligence units in the total Force.(3) Most RC MI units have a CAPSTONE(4) relationship with a regular army unit. This creates interesting situations for the commanders who will have two Officer Efficiency Reports (OER) for the same period, or portions of the same period. As a result, Commanders are faced with ethical and professional challenges as to which "master" should be served. Should the commander focus the unit on its CAPSTONE mission and satisfy operational objectives, or should he devote his attention to ARCOM or Brigade training objectives, thus improving his chances for a more favorable rating? Other areas of concern include the assignment of unqualified officers as unit commanders and the lack of an MI RC command structure above unit level.

Finally, Operation Desert Storm requirements reflected a propensity to use RC MI unit personnel to cross-level non-MI units notified for mobilization. Units deploying in support of war requirements should be at maximum fill, but not at the expense of crippling units satisfying other strategic needs. At least two MID(S)s were rendered "C4" by such personnel transfers.(5) Replacements for these units would not have been available for a minimum of nine months, had they been mobilized, because of technical and security requirements. These issues are not new, but they are persistent.(6)

SCOPE

Just as the active Army is having to make a thorough evaluation and tough decisions regarding its roles and missions, the Reserve Components are also faced with new challenges, including the decision to absorb or turn away personnel that will be leaving the active component during the next few years.

LTG Eichelberger, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), projecting the desired future of MI assets by the year 2000, has isolated a number of issues that are of particular concern to him.(7)

The DCSINT, in looking at the policy for all military intelligence assets, has identified several reserve-specific issues that require attention. These can be summarized in four words: readiness, training, funding and contingency support.(8)

These issues, in affect, form the basis and establish the parameters for this study. Reserve readiness, command, professionalism and training all have a direct impact on the DCSINT's concerns. It will be shown that these issues are closely entwined with the issues identified at the outset.

ENDNOTES

1. Michael I. Handel, (ed), Leaders and Intelligence, pg 5.
2. John Macartney, "Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, September 1988, pg 1.
3. "Almanac." DEFENSE 90, November/December 1990, pg 16. The Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, in its May 1990 report, places the figure at 54%. pg 20.

4. The CAPSTONE program was developed to provide active army leadership to reserve component units. The first real test of the program came during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and, frankly, it came unraveled. Reserve units were mobilized on the basis of personal knowledge, not CAPSTONE alignments. Specifically, the 377th TAACOM was left at home, while the 21st TAACOM (Augmentation) was mobilized. The 21st's mission is Western Europe, the 377th's is southwest Asia. See Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, U.S. Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, pp 82-83. They explain: "Captstone [was]...inaugurated in 1979, ...'shows the planned wartime alignment of all Active and Reserve Component units, where they are going to fight, in what sequence these units will deploy, and who they will be expected to support.'"

5. Ibid., pg 92. There are four categories of conditions, C1 thru C4. C4 is "not combat ready", and requires at least five weeks of training, after reaching minimum personnel manning strengths, at least 70%. In the case of highly specialized fields, such as military intelligence, finding the replacement personnel is the most difficult step, as the individuals must have security clearances, as well as technical expertise.

6. E.g. for instance, Andrew M. Rutherford, COL, "Reserve Military Intelligence in the Total Army," Military Intelligence, Vol. 6, January-March 1980.

7. C.B. Eichelberger, LTG. US ARMY: MI 2000, pg 5.

8. Ibid., pg 4-1.

Chapter II

Current Reserve Component Military Intelligence Organizations

CAPSTONE provides the basis for establishing planning and training associations to enable units to focus planning on specific wartime missions and, where feasible, to train in peacetime with the organization they will operate with in wartime.(1)

Forces Command (FORSCOM) has primary responsibility for training and management of most US Army reserve units.(2) Towards that end, FORSCOM staff officers have closely monitored the use of reserve MI assets, and have made some consolidations meant to make the units more productive. The most recent effort was in 1989, when a thorough evaluation was made of the utilization of MID(S)s, resulting in CAPSTONE realignments for a number of units.(3)

As with most of the Army, reserve MI units are operating under a Modified Table of Operations & Equipment (MTOE), many of them still based on the mid-1970s "H" series TOE.

Major RC MI organizations include: Military Intelligence Detachments (Strategic) [STRATMID or MID(S)], Tactical Exploitation Battalions [MI Bn(TE)], Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence (CEWI) Battalions, linguistic units, and Brigade and Division MI support companies or detachments. Other especially important organizations are the Intelligence Training Army Area Schools (ITAAS). Table II-1 provides a listing of current MI RC units.

Reserve Component Military Intelligence Units & Sections

Unit Type	#
Military Intelligence Detachments (S)	59•
CEWI Battalions	10
Counter Intelligence Companies & Dets	5
Linguistic Units	11•
Bde & Div MI Separate Cos & Dets	7
RC ACR/Brigade S-2s	26
ARNG Division G-2s	10
Tactical Exploitation Battalions	5
Intelligence Tng Army Area Schools (ITAAS)	5•
Special Forces Groups S-2s	4
CCONUS MI Group - Europe (MIG-E)	1•
EAC MI Brigade	1•
EAC Intelligence Center	1•
ASA Companies	2
EW Aviation Company	1
Interrogation & Exploitation Companies	3
Technical Intelligence Companies	2
Target Exploitation (TAREX) Company	1
Aerial Reconnaissance Surveillance Bn	1
Imagery Interpretation Company	1
Aerial Exploitation Battalions	2
Total Units:	158

•Colonel Commands

SOURCE: Directory of Reserve Component Military Intelligence Units
& Sections (Draft), April 1990.

Table II-1

Military Intelligence Detachments (Strategic) [MID(S)]

The precise genesis of Military Intelligence Detachments, more commonly referred to as STRATMIDS, is not well documented. Similar organizations existed shortly after WW II, with formal development occurring in the early 1950's. As the Cold War evolved, more and more strategic intelligence missions were identified, and the STRATMIDS became a valuable source of reliable strategic intelligence on specific areas of the world. The preponderance of effort has been directed at the Soviet Union and its allies, but MID(S)s are tasked with the development of strategic intelligence virtually on a global scale. For instance, some units are focused on Warsaw Pact countries, including satellite nations such as Cuba or Angola. Other units are assigned specific geographic locations, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, without regard to political or religious orientation. In general, unit missions have evolved over the years as a required strategic appraisal or study is identified by an agency, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, and a MID(S) is given the task of conducting the research and providing the study. Over time, the majority of the MID(S) have developed a known expertise, and studies are directed to the appropriate unit.

These units are directed, by FORSCOM regulation, to conduct their primary mission during periods of Inactive Duty for

Training (IDT). IDT is commonly known as "weekend drill," usually conducted monthly. Although the units are small in size (nine personnel), they are intentionally designed to be rank heavy, both in officer and enlisted members. The rationale is that unit members will not have time to develop soldier skills, and by assigned more senior personnel to MID(S) there will be less requirement for common soldier skills training. Further, since they are all commanded by a colonel, they comprise over 90% of all colonel Commands in RC MI units.

Recognizing that reserve personnel tend to be more static than their AC counterparts, STRATMIDS rely on long-term membership of pre-qualified personnel to accomplish their missions. The units are too small to justify full time manning or support, and are generally satellited off of another MI unit (Battalion) for the administrative support required for a reserve Troop Program Unit (TPU).(4)

STRATMIDS are scattered throughout the United States, with the preponderance being located in the 1st and 4th CONUSA areas (Figure II-1). There are STRATMIDS in 19 ARCOMS, with 13 ARCOMS having three or more such units.(5) The significance of this will be addressed in Chapter V.

The aforementioned FORSCOM major evaluation of STRATMIDS in 1989 placed most of the units under operational control of two agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Army Intelligence Agency (AIA) (Table II-2).(6) The assignment of

Military Intelligence Detachments (S) by CONUSA




Figure II-1

these units resulted in a nearly equal division of the units between DIA and AIA. Direct Support units (DS), such as those under CAPSTONE alignment with HQ USAREUR, are also under the oversight of DIA or AIA, but under the operational control of their parent headquarters.

Missions of STRATMIDS vary, depending on the agency supported. Linguistic requirements are established as needed. For instance, the 453rd MID(S) requires Russian language in order to conduct research in its area of assignment. Research is conducted in both open source material and in classified reports. As a rule, the unit must translate open source material, whereas classified reports will already have been translated into English. On the other hand, the 432d MID(S) does not require a language, as most of its open sources are in English. The unit does prefer to have personnel familiar with French, since much of the relevant material may be in this language.

Figure II-2 shows the standard STRATMID TOE. There are no corresponding AC units, although individual higher headquarters have cells or sections devoted to similar assignments.

Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Battalion (CEWI)

RC CEWI battalions were organized in 1981, parallel to AC tactical battalions, with a mission of providing various intelligence products to a combat (RC) division. Products are

Military Intelligence Detachments (S) CAPSTONE & Mission Alignments

DIA	AIA
DIA Core MID(S)s	AIA Core (MID)s
308, 401, 408, 409	309, 400, 402, 411, 415
417, 420, 421, 423	416, 419, 424, 428, 432
446, 448, 453, 462	433, 434, 440, 442, 445
465, 477, 480, 479	449, 450, 454, 466, 467
481, 484, 486, 488	470, 471, 474, 476, 478
698, 837	487, 490
Direct Theater Support MID(S)s	
IPAC - 458	USLANTCOM - TBD
USAREUR: 403, 404, 405	
407, 439, 443	

SOURCE: George J. Walker, BG, Director of Intelligence, J2 FORSCOM,
MEMORANDUM SUBJ: United States Army Reserve (USAR) Military
 Intelligence Detachments (Strategic) (MID(S)) Training
 Relationships, Atlanta, 7 August 1989.

Table II-2

Military Intelligence Detachments Strategic





Figure II-2


generally reports generated by the unit's subordinate companies. The CEWI Battalion companies are capable of providing the supported division an all-source intelligence center, conducting operations security, and executing electronic warfare missions. The 242d CEWI Battalion is shown in Figure II-3, and is representative of the ten RC CEWI Battalions.(7) All of these units operate on a more-or-less standard MTOE, with mission-specific requirements (e.g., languages) unique to each. Of the ten battalions, five are located in the First CONUSA area, and the remainder are well scattered. In addition to the CEWI battalions, there are a number of independent CEWI companies, primarily in 2d CONUSA area, that are not subordinate to an MI battalion.

CEWI Battalions are under CAPSTONE alignment with either active or reserve divisions, and will perform missions under the guidance of the supported divisions. Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) are written to support the divisions' missions; annual training, when possible, is conducted with and in support of the divisions.

Military Intelligence Group - Europe (MIG-E)

The MIG-E is a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) unit that is unique in the RC MI structure. It was created in 1983 as a provisional unit. Although a subordinate of the 7th ARCOM in Heidelberg, Germany, MIG-E directly reports to the

MI Bn (CEWI) Reserve Components



Strength Data (Typical):	REQ	AUTH
	Officers:	27 26
	WO:	14 14
Enlisted:	429	280
	<u>470</u>	<u>320</u>

Figure 11-3

Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT), US Army Europe (USAREUR). Its missions are assigned and closely monitored by the DCSINT's staff. These include providing strategic intelligence and classified studies as directed, providing manning for intelligence liaison requirements for USAREUR, and supplying intelligence staff officers for USAREUR exercises. The MIG-E also has a Central Army Group (CENTAG) cell that works with the CENTAG Intelligence element in NATO exercises.


Figure II-4 portrays the current TDA of the MIG-E. It reflects changes resulting from an evaluation of the needs of the DCSINT, HQ USAREUR, and the capabilities of the MIG-E, in 1988.

Although this is the only such organization in the reserves, the MIG-E is a valuable model of what can be done to make the reserves more responsive to national security needs.

Tactical Exploitation Battalion (MI Bn (TE))

Tactical exploitation battalions are similar in design to CEWI battalions, but are larger, and have the added capability of providing electronic warfare collection as well as electronic countermeasures (ECH). These battalions are roundout units to MI Brigades. For instance, the 338th MI Bn (TE) is a roundout battalion to the 205th MI Brigade, V Corps.

Military Intelligence Group - Europe Reserve Components



Strength Data: REQ* AUTH

Officers:	28	22
WO:	2	2
Enlisted:	71	33
	<u>101</u>	<u>57</u>

*Proposed TDA change that includes several IMA positions.

Figure II-4

Its Mission Essential Task List (METL) is developed from its CAPSTONE guidance. In the case of the 338th, this guidance is:

- Conduct intelligence & electronic warfare operations (IE), as a roundout battalion of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, in support of V Corps.
- Attach elements of specific line companies to brigade counterparts.
- Augment corps tactical operations center and provide corps document exploitation and technical intelligence assets.
- Perform corps GSR role with electronic countermeasures and electronic support measures assets. (8)


The battalions are organized as shown in Figure II-5, each with five subordinate companies. The Counterintelligence Interrogation Company provides the commander with the opportunity to gain near-real-time information on enemy equipment from prisoners of war, refugees or defectors.

There are five tactical exploitation battalions in the RC. Four of them have been focused on the Soviet Union, and the fifth's primary mission has been East Germany. It is reasonable to expect that one or more of these will have its mission altered in the near future to reflect changes in strategic threat perception.

Conclusion

There is nothing exotic or esoteric about the structure of MI RC units, with the possible exception of the STRATMIDS.

MI Bn (TE) Reserve Components



Strength Data (Typical):		REQ	AUTH
Officers:		36	36
WO:		37	37
Enlisted:		460	362
		<u>533</u>	<u>435</u>

Figure II-5

They follow normal unit organization, have missions parallel to, or in support of, active or reserve divisions, and emphasize training and development of soldier skills.

The most significant aspect of MI RC unit structure is the unique STRATMID, which, as noted, has no counterpart. Even its high rank structure has parallels in many other organizations (e.g., Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units).

Generally, MI RC units are held to the same training standards, the same technical and linguistic requirements and the same missions as like AC organizations. The organizations reviewed comprise nearly 6,000 reserve intelligence personnel, all of them expected to be fully trained and qualified to perform intelligence functions.

As will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, the difficulty with MI RC units lies not in existing unit structure, but in the lack of higher MI echelons to ensure all standards are met.

ENDNOTES

1. Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice, pg 13-15.
2. Ibid., pg 13-12.
3. George J. Walker, BG, Director of Intelligence, J2 FORSCOM, MEMORANDUM, SUBJ: United States Army Reserve (USAR) Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic)(MID(S)) Training Relationships, Atlanta, 7 August 1989.
4. G. Lee Southard, LTC, "MID(S): Reserve Components in a Strategic Intelligence Role," Military Intelligence, Vol. 6, January-March 1990, pg 14. Personal knowledge of author from command of STRATMID.

5. Unsigned letter, FORSCOM J-2, to author, 27 December 1990, showing capitulation of MID(S) by ARCOM in CONUS.

6. Walker.

7. John K. Holsonback, COL, Chief, Documents Division, MEMORANDUM, SUBJ: Approved Authorization Document - MTOE 34285LA07 AR1089, Atlanta, 7 November 1988.

8. 338th MI Bn (TE) Mission Essential Task List, with CAPSTONE Guidance, 17 December 1990.

Chapter III

Critique of Current MI RC Organizations & Management

"One who confronts his enemy...in a decisive battle yet who, because he begrudges rank, honours, and a few hundred pieces of gold, remains ignorant of his enemy's situation is no general."
(1)

In the overview of projected MI assets in the year 2000, the DCSINT, LTG Eichelberger, expressed concern that "...the MI structure will continue to be significantly undermanned, especially in officers." (2) Under the current structure, MI RC units are not managed efficiently. Thus, an important intelligence asset is being wasted, and important production goals may not be met. Overall, even more extraordinary measures than those called for by the DCSINT for the regular forces will have to be applied to the RC in order to ensure that the Total Force concept is a productive reality, and not a mere slogan.

The previous chapter provides a limited review of unit organizations. Except for the reserve-unique STRATMIDS, RC MI units are organized and operated the same as in the active component. In the AC, however, there are echelons above the basic unit level that provide command and control of MI assets. Primarily, these higher echelons are in brigades or field stations. Further, Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is

a source of doctrinal policy that generally ensures maximum utilization of MI resources.

Without higher reserve echelons, MI units tend to be assigned to military police, transportation or area support brigades or groups. In many instances, this not only leads to misunderstanding of the value of intelligence assets, but to the misuse of them as well. Following are some specific instances of the effects of subordinating MI units to non-MI headquarters. Most of the cases cited are from personal knowledge of the author; regrettably, they have occurred across a number of ARCOMs, thus indicating that the problems are systemic. The impact on readiness, command, professionalism and training vary from one ARCOM to another, and is largely a function of the qualifications of the individual MI unit commanders. Another factor that is difficult to quantify, but can have a major impact on these four issues, is the degree of familiarity of the ARCOM staff with the intelligence discipline.

Readiness

The 7th ARCOM, located in Heidelberg, Germany, uses the motto: "All ready, and already here." The personnel belonging to the reserve units in Western Europe are on the ground, and will require very little time for mobilization or deployment.(3) However, the same motto, no matter how desirable, cannot be applied to CONUS-based reserve units, particularly RC MI

organizations. This is not the result of any capricious intent on the part of personnel involved, but rather a reflection of the difficulties faced in both commanding RC MI units, and managing them at higher levels.

Unless current trends, prejudices and bureaucratic policies are changed, the reserve structure will continue to be less than fully responsive and will continue to generate frustrations for dedicated MI professionals. More importantly, the readiness of the RC will be in serious question. With anticipated reductions in AC units, it is possible there will be an excess of MI officers available for the RC. There is a very real possibility, however, that the RC will be unable to take maximum advantage of this situation. As a result, these highly-qualified and fully-trained officers may well be under-utilized, at best, and possibly not employed at all.


These officers may fail to reach even minimum potential as a result of several established programs. Under current reserve policy, an officer leaving active duty must go into the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) for an unspecified period of time. ARCOMs and Training Divisions are traditionally reluctant to access officers from the IRR, except in extreme situations, to fill vacancies.(4)

Reluctance to access an unknown officer from the IRR is deeply rooted in the belief that reserve units are "home town organizations," and many individuals join them as much for

camaraderie as for professional reasons. While this is a subjective statement, it is not uncommon for officers to remain with the same ARCOM or Training Division throughout his or her reserve career. This does not mean that these are not quality officers, as the vast majority of them are, but it does make it difficult (but not impossible) for outsiders to gain access to a Troop Program Unit (TPU).(5)

The IRR is the single largest source of pre-trained or prior-service personnel, not in Reserve or Guard units, available in the event of national emergency. The majority of personnel in the IRR are simply completing the remainder of required service time. This is not merely a subjective statement. Figure III-1 shows the trend of the IRR for the past 25 years. Clearly, the end of the draft in 1973 drastically reduced the number of pretrained soldiers in the IRR.(6) However, for the soldiers leaving the active army, or being promoted out of a position in the reserves, being sent to the IRR should not be regarded as a "death sentence" for those desiring a reserve career. Regulations and policy guidance make it abundantly clear that the Army Reserve Personnel Center (ARPERCEN) is responsible for training and assignment of officers from the IRR.(7) In reality, however, ARPERCEN fails to adequately manage officer personnel, and will seldom direct that a member of the IRR be accepted into a unit vacancy. This

Size of the Army Individual Ready Reserve, Fiscal Years 1964-90*



Sources: Data for fiscal 1964-77 from *America's Volunteers*, p. 221; fiscal 1978-86 data from Major General William F. Ward, chief, Army Reserve, *The Posture of the Army Reserve-FY88* (U.S. Army Reserve), p. 37; and fiscal 1987 figure and fiscal 1988-90 projections from *Manpower Requirements Report for FY 1989*, p. 40-50.

FIGURE III-1

is particularly true as officers increase in rank. Generally, the best opportunity for an officer to move from the IRR into a more productive reserve position is through the Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA). If an officer is sufficiently aggressive, he or she will often identify a unit vacancy and manage to convince the commander to allow them to join their unit.(8)

A more serious problem facing the MI RC assets in the coming decade is the relationship of RC units to their AC counterparts, particularly if there is an existing CAPSTONE alignment. Most RC MI units have such an alignment. In too many instances, Agencies with subordinate units (i.e., DIA and its 29 MID(S)s) are reluctant to assume any direct responsibility beyond assignment of mission requirements. This is not done negligently, but out of regard for the traditional reserve command structures and

sensitivity to local general officer interests. As a result, the MI commander is often faced with the challenge of meeting mutually exclusive directives. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

Command

Roger Nye describes command as the ability to manage when management is called for, and "...to lead well when leadership is necessary." (9) Army Field Manual (FM) 22-103 highlights that senior leaders must control four processes to accomplish their goals. These processes are command, control, leadership and management. (10)

Active and reserve commanders have many parallel challenges. Reserve commanders, however, face challenges apart from traditional military problems. For instance, AC commanders can reasonably expect their personnel to devote most of their duty time to the mission. If a project requires extra hours or weekend work to be completed, all the Commander has to do is give the order. RC commanders have to compete for time, one of the most elusive of resources, with their personnel's civilian employers. Further, if RC commanders want their personnel to put in an extra weekend, or hours in the evening, they must either have funds to pay for it or persuade their unit members to put in the extra time for the good of the unit and the mission.

AC commanders have a reasonable expectation of being provided trained and qualified personnel against vacancies. RC commanders almost always must program training resources to cross-train personnel that have been recruited for vacancies, but are not qualified in a particular required specialty.

Within the RC MI community, there are more specific challenges. For instance, there are considerable requirements for linguists in the reserve components. Unlike the active component, however, reserve commanders are not able to fund language training. Further, assuming qualified linguists are available, maintenance of linguistic capabilities is incredibly difficult.(11)

These, and other, challenges to a commander are made more difficult in the RC by, strangely enough, the nearly unique promotion opportunities available in intelligence units. Of the 158 MI units shown in Table II-1, over sixty of them require an MI-qualified colonel to be commander. Such commands are rare in the RC, and they are eyed covetously. As a result, and contrary to regulations, a number of these positions are frequently filled with non-MI qualified personnel, leading to further problems in professionalism and training.

Regrettably, the vast majority of these are commands in name only. This situation is created by the unique STRATMIDS organization. As shown in Chapter II, these organizations only have 9 personnel assigned to them, yet the commander is a colonel.

Since there is no staff, no full-time support, and limited resources, the units are generally attached to another unit for administrative support, and subordinated to the aforementioned brigades or groups. The commanders of these organizations usually retain all of the commander's prerequisites, to include budget and resource allocation and authority to publish unit or individual orders. This, in effect, makes the colonels "officers in charge," or, as some wags have phrased it, "MID(S)s are rifle squads (-), with an O6 squad leader!"

On the operational side, the colonels in these STRATMIDS create difficulties when they are integrated into their active mission assignments. For instance, DIA would be hard pressed to assimilate usefully 29 colonels if their STRATMIDS were mobilized. This issue will be discussed in the final chapter.

Professionalism

Herbert Meyer, in his work on corporate intelligence, stresses the importance of having a professional intelligence officer in charge. He provides a lucid and coherent evaluation of the importance of intelligence to any organization, but places most reliance on the chief, or commander, by stating:

"To lead the outfit itself, the chief must have those qualities that mark an intelligence officer: a passion for facts, a taste for delving deeply into issues, an insatiable curiosity about what is really going on in far-off places and about arcane subjects....a taste for action, the capacity to make decisions...the ruthlessness to accept small losses in pursuit of larger gains."(12)

Although the foregoing is somewhat poetic, Meyer lists desirable traits of intelligence officers. The fact is, however, that RC MI units often are commanded by non-MI qualified officers, and the "chief" does not possess the qualities listed by Meyer. As a result, abuses or perversions of regulations and standards lead to lowered professional performance.

In fact, the only instances when non-MI officers should be chosen to command MI units at the lieutenant colonel (LTC) or colonel (COL) level would be in the absence of any qualified officer for the position. This is clearly stated in Army Regulation (AR) 140-10:

Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels must be qualified in the basic branch of the unit prior to assuming command. Qualified is defined as having completed the appropriate branch officer advanced course or having been designated the applicable AOC based on experience in previous branch assignments." (13)

This regulatory requirement has not deterred ARCOM and Training Division commanders from placing their personal selectees, regardless of basic branch, into choice assignments. In one ARCOM, MI battalions have proven to be the favorite assignment of non-MI officers in order to give them command time and qualify them for promotion to colonel. The current chief of staff of that ARCOM is an Air Defense Artillery officer, but as a lieutenant colonel commanded an MI battalion. In 1990, the same ARCOM appointed a Signal Corps LTC to command a CEWI battalion, despite the fact that there were at least four qualified MI LTCs available for the position.(14) In 1981, in the northeast, an

Armor officer was assigned as a lieutenant colonel to a strategic detachment, and given command of the unit two years later.(15)

Although the 1st CONUSA does hold Colonel Command selection boards, it seems strangely unconcerned about violations of regulations when it comes to lieutenant colonel positions. These same violations, however, have occurred in other CONUSAs. This practice reflects a systemic or traditional attitude towards the value and professionalism of military intelligence. Hopefully, the recently activated US Army Reserve Command (USARC) will be more pro-active in this area.

Training

Although selection of non-MI personnel to command positions is a serious problem, an even greater problem is the fact that most MI units are assigned to military police, signal or support units for command and control. It is not unusual for commanders of these units to be uninformed of the MI units' missions. Worse, some of these commanders openly state they are not interested in the MI mission. Further, they routinely countermand FORSCOM regulation 350-2.(16)

FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2 states that "...75% of Inactive Duty Training (IDT) will be devoted exclusively to support CAPSTONE intelligence requirements."(17) Obviously, if a unit is devoting 36 of 48 reserve drill periods to its real-world mission,

it has very limited time to perform the Brigade, ARCOM or Training Division directed training or activities.

An alternative management policy exists in some ARCOMs, where MI units are assigned as Direct Reporting Units (DRU) to the ARCOM. Even in these instances, however, MI Commanders are given limited command authority, and the ARCOMs still are loathe to adhere to the FORSCOM training requirements.

There is a secondary effect of this failure to appreciate the value of MI missions. When it is necessary to cross-level other units, instead of being aware of the impacts of removing the senior NCO from a strategic intelligence detachment, a commander may casually do just that. The effect is that the STRATMID, with a real-world intelligence mission, will be rendered virtually useless, as there are limited alternatives for personnel replacement. The higher commander has not considered: (1) the MI mission, (2) the security clearances and status of the affected NCO, (3) the size of the MID(S), and (4) the tasks of the NCO.

(18)

Through practice, the Commander and Senior NCO of most MID(S)s concentrate on the administration of the unit, leaving the other members free to concentrate on the heavy mission load. Normally, this is a workable solution, but causes havoc when either (or both) of these individuals is (are) removed from the unit (e.g., pulling the senior NCO out to cross level the MP Brigade that was mobilized). (19)

An additional problem, unique for STRATMIDS commanders, is presented by the Officer Efficiency Rating (OER) scheme. He may well receive two OERs for the same or overlapping periods: one from his ARCOM or Training Division chain-of-command and one from his operational or CAPSTONE chain-of-command. Only the operational chain-of-command will be fully aware and knowledgeable of the unit's mission performance. This OER should be the most reflective of how well the Commander trains his unit and conducts his mission, yet it carries the least weight as it generally is for a two-week period rather than for the entire rating period.

It is illogical for a commander, directed to devote 75% of his IDT time plus his two-week annual training time to the operational mission, to have his or her primary OER from the ARCOM, Training Division, Brigade Commanders, when these individuals will only observe the commander a maximum of 12 training assemblies during the rating period. (20)

Conclusions

Reserve commanders will always have two jobs, and they will always be competing against civilian employees for their unit members' time. Many of the distractions noted can be eliminated, and bureaucratic requirements can be made less onerous.

Although the foregoing comments and observations paint a bleak picture of RC MI organizational command and control, professionalism can be achieved by improving the command climate

of RC MI units. The result will be more productive training and employment of personnel. The bottom line will be an increased readiness posture.

If the regular forces are able to adopt the enduring themes enumerated in the DCSINT's White Paper, it will be critically important that reserve MI assets are afforded the same opportunities. If not, it is possible that the gulf between the active and reserve forces will widen, thus seriously degrading the overall capabilities of the Total Army. In order to narrow, not widen, that gap, efforts must be taken to improve the factors discussed. The noted instances of benign neglect or out-right abuse must be eliminated.

ENDNOTES

1. Sun Tzu. The Art of War, pg 144.
2. C.B. Eichelberger, LTG. US ARMY: MI 2000, pg 11.
3. There are several hundred reservists living in Europe. The majority of them are married to active duty military personnel, or work for the Department of the Army as civilians. If the latter, they cannot belong to a unit if their civilian position is "mission essential." The MI Group (RC) in Heidelberg had less than a dozen members who were DACs, the remainder being spouses of AC soldiers or airmen, employees with Department of Defense Schools, AAFES, or, in two cases, employees of German firms. The MI Group transferred three individuals to the IRR because their positions were declared Mission Essential.
4. Personal knowledge of the author. One LTC, in 1988, moved from overseas to the New York City area. He found 20 positions for which he was qualified within 70 miles of his home. Only one commander, however, would let him into his unit. The Chief of Staff of one Training Division said that they were saving all LTC vacancies for their "own" officers. The DCSPER of a Civil Affairs Group made a similar comment. The point is, however, that by regulations, these major RC commands should not be able to deny an officer in the IRR membership in a Troop Program Unit, assuming

there is a vacancy and the officer is qualified. Until current attitudes regarding career officer management are changed, these "lock-outs" will continue.

5. A cursory review of the biographies of reserve officers at the War College reflect the accuracy of this statemet. Most of them have spent their reserve troop membership career in the same ARCOM or Training Division. Again, this is not a negative in and of itself, merely a reflection of the difficulty an outsider has in gaining access to a unit.

6. Martin Binkin & William W. Kaufmann, US Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks, pg 73. The National Guard has approximately 400,000 members in units, the Army Reserve about 297,000 and the IRR has roughly 286,000. These are 1988 figures. In 1972, the IRR had over a million members, but that was when there was still a draft. The draft officially ended in June, 1973. The last conscription, however, was in December, 1972.

7. Army Command and Management: Theory and Practice, pg 13-4; 13-11.

8. Much controversy was generated in 1988 of Senator Quayle's membership in the reserve, including the fact that his family had managed to hold a position for him. However, if every officer in the USAR, including this author, were to be retired at the rank they held when a position was "reserved" for them, probably less than 10% would remain. The point is that certain aspects of the "clubiness" will never be overcome. However, it should not become such a matter of course as to deny quality officers from moving into units, at any rank.

9. Roger H. Nye. The Challenge of Command, pg 29.

10. FM 22-103, pg. 41.

11. LTC Terrance M. Ford wrote an excellent MSP on this subject for the War College, 1 February 1990.

12. Herbert E. Meyer. Real-World Intelligence, pg 88.

13. Army Regulation 140-10, page 9. Author's emphasis.

14. In 1990, a Signal Corps LTC was given command of an MI Battalion (CEWI), although there are three MID(S)s in the ARCOM, each with lieutenant colonels (MI) as XO's, two of them had majors appearing before the current O5 promotion board (both were selected) and, there was an MI lieutenant colonel on the ARCOM staff. All of these MI officers were qualified for the command, yet the ARCOM chose to give the command to an officer from another branch. The MI officer at 1st CONUSA, responsible for overseeing

MI actions within the CONUSA AO, was questioned on this practice and his response was that First Army would not presume to dictate to an ARCOM on its selection of commanders.

15. This individual, well qualified in his primary specialty but not MI, was selected to fill the XO (LTC) TOE position in 1981. Over the course of time he was promoted to colonel, and selected for the Army War College. However, there is no record of his having ever completed the MI advanced course, which is required. Significantly, in his official biography for the War College, there is no mention of his completing the MI branch qualification course nor having any MI specialties or areas of concentrations.

16. Interview with an ARCOM DCG, 7 November, 1990. Personal comment from CG, 800th MP Brigade to the Commander, 432d MID(S), September, 1989. FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, appendix c.

17. Ibid. Reserve Troop Program Units (TPUs) drill on monthly schedules. Usually there are four monthly unit training assemblies (MUTAs) on a weekend. A Unit Training Assembly (UTA) is four hours. Commanders will use a MUTA-5 to gain maximum time in moving to a training area, setting up and conducting a field exercise and returning to home station. FORSCOM Reg 350-2 exempts MID(S)s from these exercises, but ARCOM commanders tend to insist on their participation.

18. When the 77th ARCOM involuntarily transferred the senior NCO from the 432d MID(S) in December, 1990, the 432d MID(S) was stripped of the one NCO responsible for managing the Unit's administrative workload. The 432d is one of two MID(S)s whose area of expertise is Sub-Saharan Africa. The New York Times, on 26 Jan 91, noted that a number of African nations were siding with Iraq. Had that situation matured, the 432d expertise would have been needed, but was no longer available as key personnel had been used to cross-level other units.

19. Ibid. The regulation does not specifically assign responsibilities to individuals in MID(S)s. By having senior personnel assigned to the unit the intent is to limit administrative functions to the maximum extent possible. Specifically, personnel and finance actions are to be "administered by the next higher headquarters in the peacetime chain of command."

20. This author, as Commander in two separate MI commands, was visited only once during an IDT by his rater, and never by his senior rater.

Chapter IV

2d CONUSA MI (RC) Command

"The Army's first and only Reserve Military Intelligence (MI) command, activated provisionally in 1985 by Second Army, has proven its worth by assuring training for soldiers in one of the Army's most critical and technologically reliant branches.(1)

Sharon David, writing in the July 1988 "Military Intelligence" journal, recounted the background surrounding the creation of the MI Command, its goals, and the success record to that point. Although MI units in the 2d Army area were faced with the issues and difficulties cited previously, this bold (for the time) experiment with management-by-objective, regrettably, was destined to fail.

The Military Intelligence Command (MICON) was structured to resemble a Major U.S. Army Reserve Command (MUSARC), with significant differences. Some of these differences and their impacts on the MICON will be discussed in this chapter.

First, as the equivalent of an Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) or General Officer Command (GOCOM), the MICON commander should have been at least a brigadier general. No existing reserve general officer positions were available, however; so it was determined that the MICON would be commanded by a colonel, and it would have a normal staff complement.(2) The S3 was designated as the

full-time position for the command, and the Command reported directly to the 2d CONUSA. Figure IV-1 shows the Command, with its subordinate elements.

The missions of the MICOM included:

1. To command MI Troop Program Units (TPU) within the Second U.S. Army geographic area of responsibility.
2. As stated above, function as a MUSARC and report directly to Second U.S. Army.
3. Improve readiness and training of MI units.
4. Assist in the mobilization of units and individuals upon mobilization.
5. Provide command supervision over intelligence training in Second CONUSA's area of responsibility. (3)

From these missions, particularly the last, an implied mission of the MICOM was to insure that intelligence assets were properly trained. This also required supervision of Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) funds, to insure they were used properly and as intended. Further, the MICOM published an annual training circular, highlighting that "...units must be technically proficient in MI skills to accomplish their wartime missions." (4)

Additionally, the MICOM's command mission gave it oversight of operational planning as it related to MI units. Finally, half of the MI units were strategic detachments, which, as indicated previously, have limited administrative capabilities. The MICOM would provide this support. For the first time, MI TPU commanders would be subordinate to a higher headquarters that understood

Military Intelligence Command 2d CONUSA




Figure IV-1

their mission, their training requirements and their branch-peculiar needs.

Although the MICOM was greeted with enthusiasm in the reserve intelligence community, (5) there were a number of shortcomings that, in hindsight, seemed certain to doom it to failure. First, the concept was not fielded across all of the CONUSAs. Thus, it was not institutionalized. Secondly, although the Reserves were not commanded in the same manner as the National Guard, it still was necessary to have the full support of the Chief, Army Reserves (CAR); and this was not sought. Finally, there was no direct coordination with the active and reserve personnel management offices at Department of Army that are responsible for force modernization and development. Thus, the provisional MICOM was neither programmed nor submitted during the regular cycles of the Total Army Analysis scheduling.

An additional significant shortcoming in the organization of the command was the fact that the MICOM was not given the most rudimentary authority to prepare and issue routine orders for its personnel. Further, the Command did not have its own independent logistical section. Thus, the Command was unable to program and provide needed equipment and supplies, particularly petroleum and lubricants for its subordinate tactical units. Although the organizational chart for the MICOM reflected a personnel and logistic section (S1 and S4, respectively), in reality these vital

activities were provided by the 81st ARCOM.

Not least among the MICOM's problems was the difficulty of overcoming an innate resistance to functional or "stovepipe" organizations. Further, the MICOM's area of responsibility covered the entire southeastern United States. There were 22 RC MI units in these eight states. There were 14 major reserve commands, all but three of them commanded by general officers. In short, the MICOM's span of control was far greater than its resources.

Another potential problem was the fact that the colonel commanding the MICOM had six subordinate colonel commanders. Care would always have to be taken to ensure the MICOM commander was the senior colonel, otherwise the OER rating schemes would become convoluted.(6) Although this did not become an issue it highlights a missed opportunity. Had the MICOM addressed the MID(S) command structure, and had there been a willingness to downgrade these to lieutenant colonel positions with a subsequent consolidation of resources, perhaps there would have been less resistance to the creation of the command. In other words, trading six detachment commanders for a new colonel command would have been a more marketable proposal.

Although the 2d CONUSA MICOM has been demobilized, the idea had great merit. Hopefully it will be reconsidered in the future. A lot of effort and thought went into the concept, although the timing and command and control considerations were not "right".

Once the US Army Reserve Command (USARC) is fully operational, the idea of a MICOM in each of the CONUSAs may be supportable.

ENDNOTES

1. Sharon David, "Second Army Success Story," Military Intelligence, Volume 14, No. 3, pp. 45-47. The quotation is on pg.45
2. General officer positions in the reserve components are tightly controlled. As a rule, there will have to be a trade off from one command to another to gain such a position. The MI Community, not having any general officer positions, was in no position to make such a trade. That is not as crass as it may sound, but reflects the tremendous political pressure, and importance, that is placed on general officer billets, whether in the RC or the AC.
3. Interview with Sam Roakes, DAC, J-3, FORSCOM, Atlanta, 29 November 1990.
4. 2d MI Command Training Circular 350-89-2, pg 1.
5. David, pg 45.
6. Army regulations require progressively higher commanders to be senior in date-of-rank to subordinates. There are provisions for juniors to command and rate seniors, but it requires the first general officer in the chain-of-command to authorize this in writing. This authorization must be placed in each rated officer's file.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS and CONCLUSIONS

"Good intelligence is a force multiplier which demands the highest possible efficiency in performing combat essential tasks of the intelligence mission assigned to MI units."(1)

FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 places great emphasis on training of military intelligence personnel. The thesis of this study, however, is that training and readiness will not be realized without efficient command, coherent organization and professionalism.

Naval Reserve intelligence faced this same problem nearly 20 years ago. While their solution would not be directly applicable to the Army reserves, the fact that they have established a clearly defined and operationally sound system is significant. It is also evidence that bold concepts may be adopted if inertia or resistance to change is overcome. The organization of Naval reserve intelligence units is shown in Appendix B.(2)

Army Reserve policy makers have a unique opportunity to take a bold step forward in improving the intelligence environment. There is a clear need for a higher MI echelon in a number of ARCOMs, as well as for an intelligence staff officer. Further, it is time for an honest evaluation of the Strategic Military

Intelligence Detachments. Questions that need to be answered include:

- Is it necessary to have a colonel as commander?
- Are these commanders, or merely officers-in-charge?
- Are the units structured to serve the user agencies?
- Is an MI Brigade or an MI Command needed in the reserve structure?

The choices for the higher reserve MI echelon include an MI Group (MIG) within ARCOMs, an MI Command within the CONUSAs, or independent MI Brigades, perhaps as direct reporting units to the USARC.

The latter two options are extremely attractive, and would give MI officers an opportunity to compete for general officer (GO) billets as commanders of such units. It is very difficult, however, to justify GO billets. As a rule, these are only available if a trade-off can be arranged. That is, if an existing GO position could be down-graded to colonel, then the GO billet could be used in another capacity. It is highly unlikely, even with the strongest of argument and most compelling justification, that anyone in the chain-of-command could be persuaded to give up any GO positions. If a future reduction of the Reserve results in general officer positions becoming available, these options should be considered.

The matter of creating a MIG, however, is another issue. There are 58 MID(S)s commanded by colonels. These are commands

that are far from being properly utilized, nor, frankly, are they required. As shown in Table V-1, nineteen ARCOMS have MID(S)s, and thirteen of them have three or more. Ten of these ARCOMS also have CEWI battalions, as well as other MI units. A MIG would be the ideal organization for administrative command-and-control of ARCOM MI assets and personnel. Most importantly, the MI community has something of value to trade in order to gain the MIG.

Before considering creation of the MIG, several questions in regard to STRATMIDS should be given at least a cursory review. Colonels in charge of intelligence detachments are not really commanders. There is no need to belabor the point, but it is doubtful that anyone would seriously argue that these units are anything more than detachments. The questions of whether the units are structured properly and whether it is necessary to have colonels in charge are less easily addressed. The author's intuitive sense is that the units are of sufficient size and orientation to properly perform their strategic research mission. A colonel in command is not necessary, and it would be more productive to replace the colonel with an additional major or company grade officer. The final answer, however, would have to come from the using agencies. This problem is beyond the scope of this paper. While it would be desirable to have the using agencies address this issue, they probably will not, preferring instead to accept whatever support is made available.

Military Intelligence Detachments (S) **Number of Units in ARCOMS, by CONUSA**

1st CONUSA		2d CONUSA	
76th ARCOM	3	81st ARCOM	4
77th ARCOM	3	121st ARCOM	1
79th ARCOM	1	125th ARCOM	1
80th ARCOM	1		
94th ARCOM	3	5th CONUSA	
97th ARCOM	5	89th ARCOM	2
98th ARCOM	2	90th ARCOM	4
99th ARCOM	4		
4th CONUSA		6th CONUSA	
83rd ARCOM	3	96th ARCOM	3
86th ARCOM	4	124th ARCOM	3
88th ARCOM	4		
123rd ARCOM	8		

TABLE V-1

Herbert Meyer identified one of the desired traits of an intelligence officer as "...[having]...the ruthlessness to accept small losses in pursuit of larger gains."(3) It is time for the intelligence community to recognize the incongruity of the colonel commands in MI detachments and propose some "small losses." A "strategic approach" would be to trade these command billets for something far more worthwhile: an echelon above the battalion and MID(S) level in ARCOMS.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Military Intelligence Group

There are a number of potential alternatives available for consideration of establishing the MIG. First would be to locate one in each of the ARCOMs that currently have STRATMIDs. Under this concept, STRATMID commands should be given up as "bill payers" for the Group command position, which should be a politically palatable suggestion to the ARCOM and USARC. For example, if the five MID(S)s in the 97th ARCOM were all changed to being cells under the MIG, the ARCOM would lose four colonel command positions, retaining only the newly established, but far more productive and meaningful, MIG command. Overall, the MI community would end up with 19 very strong colonel commands, and USARC or FORSCOM would have 39 colonel commands to be re-allocated elsewhere, predominantly in non-MI units.

An alternative would be to place a MIG in each of the ARCOM or Training Divisions, a total of 31. A list of the 31 ARCOMs and

Training Divisions that would have a MIG is found at Appendix C. This would probably be more acceptable in the intelligence community, as it would provide an additional 12 colonel positions.

The MIG should be organized as a TDA headquarters, commanded by a colonel, with normal staff elements. The Executive Officer should be a lieutenant colonel in a full-time AGR position. The full-time staff would include a full-complement of reserve staff officers, for the most part majors or lieutenant colonels. Some civilian positions could be transferred from organizations currently providing support to MI RC units. Additional consolidations might also be available in other areas. A notional MI Group is shown in Figure V-1. Specific strength figures, including civilian and full-time military, would have to be developed. There should be a standard TDA HQs structure, with units added as required in individual ARCOMs or Training Divisions. The Reserve Component Military Intelligence Staff (RCMIS) reflects MI personnel assigned to non-MI units, such as G-2 to National Guard Divisions or S-2 to Special Forces Groups. These personnel are found in all ARCOMs and Training Divisions, and are the strongest justification for a MIG in all major commands. The MIG responsibility for these individuals would be limited to nominating MI personnel for vacancies, oversight of MI-specific training, and monitoring of career development.

The proposed MIG should have intelligence oversight for all MI assets in the ARCOM area of operations, except for Intelligence




Figure V-1

Training Army Area Schools (ITAAS). MI units with CAPSTONE alignments should continue to be under the operational control of those agencies, divisions or headquarters. Further, the MIG should accumulate budgets from subordinate MI units, and submit a consolidated MI budget to the ARCOM. Finally, the MIG should be responsible for allocation of MI resources, including management of the Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) program. The five ITAASs should remain as Direct Reporting Units (DRU) to their respective CONUSA, and in time should become DRUs to the USARC. Direct coordination between the ITAAS and ARCOMs in the same geographic region would continue to function as it does under the current system.

The MIG Commander's functions and responsibilities should include, but not be limited to:

- Serving as ARCOM DCSINT.
- Commanding all MI strategic detachments.
- Providing letter input for MI unit commanders' OERs to appropriate headquarters.
- Nominating personnel to fill MI vacancies in non-MI units.

There are several advantages to be gained from creation of the MIG. First, ARCOMS would benefit from a consolidation of MI units and assets. The workload from processing of reports, alone, would decrease significantly. For instance, there are three MID(S)s in the 77th ARCOM, each with a requirement to process a total of 196 reports each training year. If the MID(S)s were elements of a

MIG, then these nearly 600 reports, required by the ARCOM, the CONUSA or FORSCOM, would be reduced by at least two-thirds. This would be even more significant in the 123rd ARCOM, where eight MID(S) reports would be consolidated. Additional advantages would be realized for intelligence users in having a single MI headquarters with which to coordinate, instead of the three or four or more that now exist in ARCOMS. For the tactical MI units, it would give them a peacetime organization much like their wartime chains-of-command.

Finally, there would be better control of intelligence training resources. The MIGs would be the single point of contact for the ITAAS, would manage the Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) Program, and would be the ARCOM proponent for the Military Intelligence Special Training Element (MISTE) Program.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT)

As mentioned previously, the USARC has a DCSINT position on its staff. The responsibilities of the DCSINT, in addition to serving as the Senior Intelligence Officer to the Chief, Army Reserve, will include overall direction of intelligence and counterintelligence operations within the USARC.(4)

A staff officer at USARC level will have a difficult task in coordinating with over 150 major units. The span of control will prove nearly impossible. An option would be to have some control through an intermediate intelligence staff at the CONUSA. In

theory, however, that is the system currently in place, and it has not proven to be as effective or efficient as desired.

The preferred option is to have a DCSINT in each ARCOM or Training Division, particularly those with subordinate MI units. There is clear precedent for such a staff function, and it is doubtful if any major active component unit, especially a unit commanded by a major general, does not have a deputy for intelligence.

The Commander of the ARCOM MI Group would serve in the dual function as the ARCOM DCSINT. If the 19 MI Groups are created, the USARC DCSINT would then have a manageable span of control. This would remain valid, even if the number of DCSINTs were expanded to 31.

The ARCOM DCSINT would have responsibilities identical, relative to the level of command, to those of the USARC DCSINT. An extract of USARC Regulation 10-5 is at Appendix D.

Military Intelligence Detachments (Strategic)

These units have proven to be the workhorses of the reserve strategic intelligence effort. Reluctance of supported agencies to become involved in the management of the units, as well as difficulties in providing support for the units during periods of annual training and IDT, however, indicate a need for an evaluation of their effectiveness.

Although there are sufficient regulations regarding the proper control of MID(S)s, in reality the units suffer from benign neglect.(5) The agencies supported by the units welcome the efforts and products, but have limited interest in absorbing whole units during periods of annual training or mobilization. While the need for the intelligence product is legitimate and visible, the absorption of the colonel onto the average staff is difficult, and usually not fully productive. Using agencies prefer (and FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 encourages and allows) having individual unit members on active duty for special projects, at different times. This is known as "fragmented AT", and makes it difficult for commanders to maintain unit integrity. Finally, many units have difficulties in completing their final products. The research and initial drafts can be completed on locally available equipment, from pen and pencil to typewriters or older word processors. Few of the units, however, have sufficient support staff or equipment to generate a final product. User agencies provide as much of this support as possible, but are frequently constrained in what they are able to supply.

The supported agencies require experienced intelligence personnel to research, analyze and produce studies and reports. They do not need a commander or enlisted personnel well-versed in finance and personnel procedures. Support functions, including finance and personnel actions, detract from the amount of productive time unit members may devote to the mission.

If the MID(S)s were re-organized as detachments, rather than commands, and subordinated to an MI Group, the following benefits would accrue:

- The colonels could be replaced by a captain or major, adding to the research and production capability of the unit.
- All administrative functions would be performed by the MI Group staff, realizing economies of scale.
- Supported agencies would find it much easier to coordinate with, and make productive use of, all members of the detachment.
- Equipment requirements could be consolidated, and better justified and funded, at the MIG for all Detachments within an ARCOM.

CONCLUSIONS

Improvements in professionalism and readiness in RC MI units could be realized by adding an MI Group as well as a DCSINT to ARCOMs. These changes to the organizational structure would allow for better management of MI assets, both individuals and units. The elimination of the colonel commands in the MID(S)s, although perhaps removing a promotion incentive, would give the remaining commands far more viability and reliability. An MI Group, with its commander dual-hatted as the ARCOM DCSINT, should be able to prevent the types of abuses and perversions discussed in Chapter III.

Finally, implementation of these few recommendations will contribute to meeting the DCSINT's concerns, as outlined in MI

2000. These changes will provide for better training, more judicious use of available funds, a professional structure that will allow prompt response in contingencies, and an overall increase in readiness.

ENDNOTES

1. FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2, pg. C-1.
2. Interview with CPT David Zickafoose (USNR), 31 January 1991.
3. Meyer, pg. 88.
4. USARC Regulation 10-5, pg. 5-1.
5. FORSCOM Regulation 350-2 directs that MID(S)s, for instance, will be supported by the next higher unit in the chain-of-command. However, in one ARCOM MID(S)s were formerly attached to an MP Brigade. The Brigade further delegated the support role to an MI Battalion, commanded by a lieutenant colonel. Over time, it became routine for the lieutenant colonel to assume responsibility for approving the MID(S)s' request for orders, payrolls, and personnel actions. Obviously, units commanded by colonels should not be getting approval for their actions from a lieutenant colonel. This is an example of the benign neglect: the ARCOM didn't track the Brigade's policies, and the colonels in command of the MID(S)s did not speak up, until a colonel from outside the ARCOM assumed command, challenged and changed the system.


APPENDIX A

Glossary

AC	Active Component
AGR	Active Guard/Reserve
AIA	Army Intelligence Agency
AOC	Area of Concentration
AR	Army Regulation
ARCOM	Army Reserve Command
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARPERCEN	Army Reserve Personnel Center
CAPSTONE	Training Relationship between Reserve & Active Components
CAR	Chief, Army Reserve
CENTAG	Central Army Group (NATO - Europe)
CEWI Bn	Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Battalion (MI)
CONUSA	Continental US Army
DCSINT	Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
FM	Field Manual
FORSCOM	Forces Command
GOCOM	General Officer Command
GO	General Officer
IDT	Inactive Duty for Training
IEW	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
IMA	Individual Mobilization Augmentation
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
ITAAS	Intelligence Training Army Area School
NETL	Mission Essential Task List
MI	Military Intelligence
MI Bn(TE)	MI Battalion, Tactical Exploitation
NICOM	Military Intelligence Command

MID(S)	Military Intelligence Detachment (Strategic) (See STRATMID)
MIG	Military Intelligence Group
MISTE	MI Special Training Element Program
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization
MUTA	Monthly Unit Training Assembly (normally a weekend, or "MUTA-4")
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
OER	Officer Efficiency Report
RC	Reserve Component
REDTRAIN	Readiness Training (funding source for MI RC Training)
STRATMID	Strategic Military Intelligence Detachment
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TPU	Troop Program Unit
USARC	US Army Reserve Command (Provisional)
USAREUR	US Army Europe
UTA	Unit Training Assembly (four hours)

**ORGANIZATION OF THE
NAVAL RESERVE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM**



— **DIRECT REPORTING** **ADDU** **LIAISON**

APPENDIX C

Major US Army Reserve Commands

1st CONUSA

97th Army Reserve Command	76th Division (Training)
77th Army Reserve Command	78th Division (Training)
79th Army Reserve Command	98th Division (Training)
99th Army Reserve Command	80th Division (Training)

2nd CONUSA

121st Army Reserve Command	100th Division (Training)
81st Army Reserve Command	108th Division (Training)
120th Army Reserve Command	
125th Army Reserve Command	

4th CONUSA

86th Army Reserve Command	85th Division (Training)
123rd Army Reserve Command	70th Division (Training)
88th Army Reserve Command	84th Division (Training)
83rd Army Reserve Command	

5th CONUSA

122nd Army Reserve Command	95th Division (Training)
89th Army Reserve Command	
102nd Army Reserve Command	
90th Army Reserve Command	

6th CONUSA

63rd Army Reserve Command	91st Division (Training)
96th Army Reserve Command	104th Division (Training)
124th Army Reserve Command	

SOURCE: William F. Ward, Posture of the U.S. Army Reserve, FY89.

APPENDIX D*

Chapter 5 DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTELLIGENCE

5-1. RESPONSIBILITIES. The Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence (DCSINT) serves as the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) to the Chief, Army Reserve. As such, the DCSINT plans, coordinates, directs, and oversees the execution of intelligence and multi-disciplined counterintelligence operations in support of the implementation of general war and special plans and exercises as directed in support of FORSCOM and USARC emergency and contingency plans. Exercises responsibility for the preparation and maintenance of intelligence plans. Establishes intelligence priorities for USARC Military Intelligence units, assets and resources. Responsible for resourcing the development and management of intelligence collection and production systems with the USARC. Manages the USARC personnel security, information security, automation security, and counterterrorism programs. In coordination with FORSCOM and in support of the CONUSA who have OPCON of CONUS assigned USAR units for operations, training, mobilization and deployment, reviews and monitors for resourcing prioritization all USAR systemic intelligence training, manning, and equipping issues and all aspects of intelligence individual (soldier and leader) training, collective training, training support, and training management and evaluation. Reviews and provides resourcing priorities for executing the RC Intelligence Training Strategy (implement through the RC Training Development Action Plan) for the USAR. Monitors readiness of intelligence units and evaluates readiness programs for continued resourcing. Prioritizes USAR intelligence training funds. Serves as a member of the Working Program Budget Advisory Committee (PBAC). Serves as the Program Director for planning, programming, budgeting, execution and evaluation of programs for which the DCSINT is the proponent.

5-2. FUNCTIONS. The DCSINT manages USAR intelligence programs, intelligence-related force integration and personnel actions, and intelligence support requirements.

*Extracted from USARC Regulation 10-5, dated November 1990

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